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INTRODUCTION 
 This Supplemental Brief responds to this Court’s questions regarding the 
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (“AIA”). Every district court which has 
considered the AIA found that it does not apply because the Mandate exactions are 
penalties, not taxes.
1
 This court cannot avoid this central question, nor can it find 
that the AIA applies without first deciding whether the Mandates themselves arise 
under the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause. Even if the 
challenged exactions were taxes, the AIA would still not apply to this case.  
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AIA DOES NOT DEPRIVE THIS COURT OF JURISDICTION.  
 
 The AIA deprives a court of jurisdiction only if the suit seeks to restrain the 
assessment or collection of a tax. Even then, the AIA does not apply if (1) it is 
clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail, and (2) 
                                           
1
  Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d 611, 627-629 (W.D. Va. 2010); 
Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F.Supp.2d 598, 613-614 (E.D. Va. 2010); Florida ex. rel. 
Bondi v. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1143-1144 
(N.D. Fla. 2010); Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 891 
(E.D. Mich. 2010). Goudy-Bachman v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 2011 
WL 223010 at *12 (M.D. Penn. 2011); U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 754 
F.Supp.2d 903, 909 (N.D. Ohio 2010). By the time the question reached the 
District of Columbia court, the Government abandoned the claim. Mead v. Holder, 
2011 WL 611139 at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. 2011) (“On January 21, 2011, Defendants filed 
a Notice stating that they do not intend to pursue their Rule 12(b)(1) arguments. 
See Notice Regarding Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 34]. The Court therefore will 
deem the Defendants’ arguments concerning the Anti-Injunction Act waived and 
will not consider them.”).  
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equity jurisdiction otherwise exists. 26 U.S.C. §7421; Enochs v. Williams Packing 
& Nav. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). See also Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 
U.S. 725, 736-748 (1974). 
 This case does not seek to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax. The 
fines associated with the Mandates are penalties under the purported authority of 
the Commerce Clause, not taxes under the Taxing and Spending Clause. Even if 
the Mandate exactions were taxes, the AIA would still not apply. Plaintiffs do not 
challenge an assessment or collection of taxes or any other IRS action. Plaintiffs 
allege that the Mandates themselves, not just the concomitant penalties, exceed 
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause and otherwise violate Plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights. (Joint Appendix (“JA”) 0012-0051).  
 In Bob Jones University and Williams Packing, the Plaintiffs challenged tax 
determinations made pursuant to Congress’ undisputed authority under the Taxing 
and Spending Clause. The parties did not contend that underlying statutes were 
unconstitutional, but rather that the IRS was wrong in denying tax-exempt status or 
assessing the tax in question. Here, Plaintiffs challenge the authority of Congress 
to impose the Mandates under the Commerce Clause. Before reaching the 
application of the AIA, this Court must first determine if the Mandates arise under 
the Commerce Clause, and the Act itself asserts, or under the Taxing and Spending 
Clause, which argument the Government concocted after the Act was challenged. 
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 Even if the Mandates were taxes, which Plaintiffs dispute, the AIA would 
still not apply because of the Williams Packing exception. Under no circumstances 
can the Government prevail in a claim that the Mandate exactions are taxes under 
the Taxing and Spending Clause and therefore subject to the AIA. Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief because they will suffer irreparable injury 
for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7. The 
Government cannot prevail on a claim that the Mandates are taxes, since the 
Mandates themselves are compelled purchases of a product, or penalties for failure 
to purchase a product, not taxes. The exactions are not designed to raise revenue 
but to deter non-compliance with the Mandates, which places them squarely in the 
category of penalties. See Dep’t of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 
767, 779-80 (1994) (“Whereas [penalties] are readily characterized as sanctions, 
taxes are typically different because they are usually motivated by revenue-raising, 
rather than punitive, purposes.”); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 
(1937) (to qualify as a tax, an exaction must be “productive of some revenue.”). 
The penalties might not raise any revenue if all citizens comply with or are exempt 
from the insurance Mandates. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A and 4980H. Neither of the 
penalties is listed as a revenue generating provision in Title IX of the Act. 124 Stat 
119 at 848-855. 
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 The Act itself distinguishes between taxes and penalties. The legislative 
history shows that Congress intended that the payments would be penalties, not 
taxes. (Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 40-43). President Obama has stated that the 
Mandate are not taxes.
2
 The exactions do not meet the criteria for income taxes. 
See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining 
“income” for tax purposes). They are not excise taxes because they are not 
assessed as the result of a commercial transaction, activity, privilege or use of 
property. See Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 180-181 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (defining 
excise taxes). The exactions are not direct or capitation taxes because they are not 
apportioned. See id. “[A] tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or 
property for the purpose of supporting the Government.” United States v. 
Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996). A 
penalty, on the other hand, connotes a sanction or a punishment for an unlawful act 
or omission. Id. “A tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of 
government; a penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute 
as punishment for an unlawful act.” United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 
                                           
2
  http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/20/obama.health.care/index.html (last 
visited January 11, 2011). Further evidence that the Act is not a revenue raising 
provision under the Taxing and Spending Clause is the fact that it originated in the 
Senate, not the House. See U.S. Const. art. I, §7, cl. 1 (“All bills for raising revenue 
shall originate in the House of Representatives …”). 
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(1931). “The two words [tax vs. penalty] are not interchangeable ... and if an 
exaction [is] “clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple 
expedient of calling it such.” Id. That is precisely what Defendants are attempting 
to do here. Every district court addressing the issue has determined such eleventh-
hour maneuvers are ineffective in changing the nature of the exactions.
3
 It is clear 
that the Government cannot prevail on a claim that the exactions are taxes under 
the Taxing and Spending Clause to which the AIA could apply. The Government 
has apparently conceded this fact as it has abandoned its AIA defense in all the 
pending appeals, including this one. In addition, in Mead, the district court denied 
the Government’s motion to dismiss the challenge to the Mandate exactions under 
the Taxing and Spending Clause, and the Government has not appealed that denial 
to the District of Columbia Circuit. Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 611139 at *23, 
appealed sub nom Seven-Sky v. Holder,  District of Columbia Circuit Court case 
11-5047. 
                                           
3
 Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d at 630 (Finding that the AIA did 
not apply because the exactions are penalties and failing to reach the Taxing and 
Spending argument because the Mandates were found valid under the Commerce 
Clause); Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d, 768, 787 (E.D. Va. 2010); Florida 
ex. rel. Bondi v. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 
2011); Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d at 895; Goudy-
Bachman v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 2011 WL 223010 at *11 (M.D. 
Penn. 2011); U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 754 F.Supp.2d at 909; Mead v. 
Holder, 2011 WL 611139 at *23 (denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss under 
General Welfare, i.e., Taxing and Spending Clause).  
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 Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief because there is no alternative 
remedy available to redress the irreparable injuries caused by the Mandates. 
Plaintiffs are seeking redress for violations of fundamental constitutional rights, 
which the Supreme Court has found constitute irreparable injury. See Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for 
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”). As 
Judge Moon said during oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, a refund suit 
would not accord Plaintiffs relief, as it would not provide a forum for challenging 
the constitutionality of the Mandates. (JA 0132-0133). As Judge Moon noted, if the 
plaintiffs are provided health insurance or are exempted under the Act, then they 
will never pay the penalty and never have the opportunity to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Mandate. (JA 0132-0133). “They would have to participate 
and keep on going until maybe some fortuitous thing down the road might cause 
them to pay the penalty.” (JA 0133). A refund suit in this case is an inadequate 
remedy. See Estate of Michael v. Lullo, 173 F.3d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1999). The 
AIA is intended to bar a suit only in situations in which Congress had provided the 
aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by which to contest the legality of 
a particular tax. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 373 (1984). No such 
remedy is available here since a suit to contest the assessment or collection of the 
penalties will not address the constitutionality of the Mandates.  
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Plaintiffs’ remedies are further limited by the fact that they do not have the 
procedural due process usually available when the IRS assesses criminal penalties 
or levies property. Congress exempted the penalties from those enforcement 
actions. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g). The notice of deficiency provided in Section 6212, 
pre-levy hearing in Section 6320, collection due process administrative hearing 
under Section 6330 and other notices and hearings under the IRC are not available 
to challenge the Act’s penalties. The individual Plaintiffs and Liberty University 
are forced to reorder their affairs because the Mandates require them to act now 
even before any penalty or alleged tax under the Mandates are due. Liberty 
University must adjust its business and insurance practices to comply with the 
requirements of the Act even before a penalty is due in 2014. Already Liberty 
University has faced financial burdens imposed by the Act. The District Court 
found that Liberty University has standing because it currently faces a concrete 
injury that is neither hypothetical nor remote. Over 1,000 employers have already 
been forced to seek a temporary waiver because of the crushing burden imposed by 
the Act. Liberty cannot wait until 2014, pay a penalty (or an alleged tax), and then 
challenge the Act. Significant provisions of the Act have already gone into effect 
and more will continue to go into effect, thus increasing the injury until the full 
weight of the Act hits in 2014. Liberty University has a current, not a future, injury 
and thus has no other adequate remedy. Even if the Mandates were taxes under the 
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Taxing and Spending Clause, the Williams Packing exception would allow the 
Plaintiffs to challenge the Act now rather than wait until payment of a penalty. The 
Government cannot prevail in its argument that the Mandates are taxes under the 
Taxing and Spending Clause, and Plaintiffs face irreparable injury with no 
adequate alternative remedy. 
II. GEORGE AND DREXEL FURNITURE DO NOT PERMIT THE AIA 
TO BE APPLIED WITHOUT FIRST DETERMINING THAT THE 
MANDATES ARE TAXES OR PENALTIES.  
 Neither of the cases cited in the second question presented permit this Court 
to apply the AIA and avoid the central issue of whether the Mandates are 
constitutional. See Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922), Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture Co. 259 U.S. 20 (1922). In George, the plaintiff filed suit to halt the 
assessment of taxes under the Child Labor Tax Law. The case was dismissed under 
the AIA because it was a suit to restrain the collection of revenue. Id. The plaintiff 
did not dispute that the exaction was a tax under the Taxing and Spending Clause. 
 In Drexel Furniture, the plaintiff was denied a refund after paying the tax 
and then challenging its validity. 259 U.S. at 34. On appeal the Supreme Court 
found that the Child Labor Tax was not a valid “tax” because it was not enacted to 
raise revenue but to coerce employers into complying with congressional 
regulations. Id. at 37-40 (“the so-called tax is a penalty to coerce people of a state 
to act as Congress wishes …”). Neither George nor Drexel Furniture imply that 
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this Court can treat the challenged Mandates or the exactions as taxes and apply 
the AIA without reaching the central question of whether the Mandates arise under 
the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause. The law challenged in 
George and Drexel Furniture, was enacted under the Taxing and Spending Clause, 
facially denominated as a tax, part of “An act to provide revenue,” and imposed an 
annual “excise tax.” Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. at 34. There was no question about 
which enumerated power supported the law. 
 Here, Congress explicitly based the Mandates (and their penalties) on the 
Commerce Clause, not the Taxing and Spending Clause. Congress rejected prior 
bills that called the Mandate exactions taxes and enacted them instead as penalties. 
The Act uses the term “tax” in describing other exactions, but the word “penalty” 
in describing the Mandate exactions. The Mandate exactions are not listed among 
the seventeen other revenue generating provisions. 124 Stat 119 at 848-855. 
Congress excluded the Mandate exactions from the usual civil and criminal 
penalties associated with non-payment of taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g).  
 Congress enacted the AIA to prevent those who are liable for taxes from 
interfering with or thwarting the collection of authorized revenues. Miller v. 
Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida, 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932). Congress was 
concerned that exactions enacted to raise revenues, i.e., taxes under Art. I §8, not 
be held up in litigation and thereby jeopardize governmental operations. See id. 
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When revenue collection is not an issue, then the Court can determine whether an 
exaction is a “tax” under Art. I §8 or a penalty disguised as a tax. The central 
question in this litigation is whether the Mandates arise under the Commerce 
Clause as the Act itself proclaims, and whether Congress exceeded it authority in 
passing the Mandates. The question of whether the Mandate exactions are penalties 
under the Commerce Clause or taxes under the Taxing and Spending Clause must 
be determined before deciding whether the AIA applies, and if so, whether the 
Williams Packing exception applies to prevent application of the AIA 
III. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT HAVE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO 
CHALLENGE THE MANDATES. 
 If the AIA applies, as question three asks Plaintiffs to assume, Plaintiffs 
would not have an adequate alternative remedy to redress its claims despite the 
fora provided under the IRC and FRCP sections cited by the Court. As discussed 
under Argument I (infra 6-8), The Mandates burden Plaintiffs now even though the 
exactions will not arise until 2014, so the constitutionality of the Mandates must be 
determined now. The future penalties under the Mandates are less onerous than the 
constitutional violations posed by the Mandates now. Without the ability to 
challenge the Mandates now, Plaintiffs have no remedy.   
Dated:  May 31, 2011. 
/s/ Mathew D. Staver 
Mathew D. Staver 
Liberty Counsel 
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